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Abstract
It is well-known in the literature that income per capita is strongly correlated with the level 
of democracy across countries. In an infl uential paper, Acemoglu et al. (2008) fi nd that 
this linear correlation disappears once they control for country-specifi c effects focusing on 
within-country variation. In this paper we fi nd evidence of a non-linear effect from income 
to democracy even after controlling for country-specifi c effects. While a positive effect 
emerges for poor countries, this effect vanishes for rich countries.
Keywords: Democracy, Income, Lipset hypothesis, panel data.
JEL classifi cation: D72, E21, C23.
Resumen
Aquellos países con mayor renta per cápita tienen generalmente niveles más altos de 
democracia. En un infl uyente artículo, Acemoglu et al. (2008) encuentran que, al controlar 
por otros factores que afectan simultáneamente a ambas variables, esta correlación lineal no 
implica causalidad. Es decir, que incrementos en la riqueza de los países no necesariamente 
implican incrementos en sus niveles de democracia. En el presente documento se encuentra 
evidencia de un efecto causal no lineal de la renta per cápita sobre el nivel de democracia, 
incluso después de controlar por otros factores a la Acemoglu et al. (2008). En concreto, 
encontramos que en los países pobres incrementos en la renta per cápita generan mayores 
niveles de democracia. Sin embargo, este efecto desaparece en los países ricos.
Palabras claves: democracia, renta, hipótesis de Lipset, datos de panel.
Códigos JEL: D72, E21, C23. 
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1 Introduction
More than 23 centuries ago, Aristotle already discussed economic prosperity as one of the factors
that stimulate democracy (Aristotle, 1932); he argued that only in a wealthy society with relatively
few people living in real poverty could democracy arise and irresponsible demagogues be avoided.
This discussion was further developed and formalized by Lipset (1959), and thus this idea is often
called the Lipset hypothesis. There is a number of mechanisms that could explain this effect, as
for example increased education and an enlarged middle class (Lipset, 1959). The cross-country
evidence examined in Barro (1999) confirms that the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis is a strong empirical
regularity.
However, in a recent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2008) find evidence against this hypothesis. In
particular, after controlling for factors that simultaneously affect both income and democracy (i.e.
country-specific fixed heterogeneity), they find that there is no evidence of a linear effect of income
on democracy. They interpret this result as evidence in favor of the idea that societies embarked on
divergent political-economic development paths at certain critical junctures in the distant past.
In this paper we revisit this hypothesis and find evidence in favor of an heterogeneous effect
of income on democracy (heterogeneous across levels of income) even after controlling for country-
specific effects in the framework of Acemoglu et al. (2008). More concretely, we find that the poorest
countries in the world might be benefited in terms of higher democracy standards from an increase
in income. However, once a certain level of economic development is reached, this effect vanishes.
As it is pointed out in North (1990), institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. That institutions affect
the performance of economies is hardly controversial. It is then plausible that economies with good
performances, in order to maintain the status quo, are going to be less prone to change their rules
than economies with poor performances.
Figure 1 provides enlightening evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In particular, Figure 1 plots
democracy1 against log GDP per capita for rich an poor countries separately.2 In order to control for
factors that simultaneously affect income and democracy in levels (i.e. country-specific effects), both
variables are expressed in deviations from country-specific time means so that only within country
variation is plotted.3 When we consider rich countries the within-country correlation between income
1The measure of democracy corresponds to Democracy Index minus Autocracy Index from Polity IV (see the Data
section for more details).
2Poor countries in Figure 1 are those in the bottom 80% of the income distribution in a given year (see the figure
for more details). Although only the top-2 deciles might be a very restrictive group, it represents a large number of
countries. It includes at least one observation of Antigua, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. This ad hoc partition of the
sample is only for illustration and driven by the results discussed later in the paper (see Section 4). In any event, very
similar results are found using alternative definitions of poor and rich, such as 70− 30 and 90− 10.
3We consider here data in deviations from country-specific means due to its straightforward connection with the
fixed effects estimators considered later in the paper (note that a simple OLS regression with the data in Figure 1
leads to the commonly-used fixed effects estimator).
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This figure plots GDP per capita and the Polity IV index of democracy over the period 1960-
2000 for rich and poor countries. In order to consider country-specific heterogeneity we plot
the variables in deviations from its country-specific time mean. We split the sample in ten-year
periods and each country-period pair is labeled as rich (poor) if its associated GDP per capita
is above (below) the 80 percentile of the empirical cross-sectional density of this variable in a
given period. See the Data section for more details on the sample and variables. The regression
represented by the fitted line in the left panel (rich countries) yields a coefficient of 0.005 (standard
error = 0.005), and the regression for poor countries in the right panel yields a coefficient of 0.203
(standard error = 0.049).
of the evidence presented in Figure 1, in this paper we relax the linearity assumption in order to
further investigate the relationship that connects income and democracy. More concretely, we are
interested in the measurement of the effect of income on institutions allowing for heterogeneous
effects across income levels. Using the same dataset than Acemoglu et al. (2008), we find that
income has a significant non-linear effect on democracy even after controlling for country-specific
unobserved heterogeneity simultaneously affecting both variables. This effect is positive for lower
values of income but it vanishes when income reaches a certain level.
and democracy is surprisingly weak. But on the other hand, when we consider poor countries, there
is a strong positive within-country association between both indicators. This informal evidence
suggests that the effect of income on democracy is not constant for every level of income, giving
support to our working hypothesis: despite economic prosperity positively influences the democracy
level in poor countries, once a certain threshold of economic development is reached this influence
disappears.
Usually, linearity is taken to be a convenient and homogeneous local approximation of a more
general model. However, in this context we are interested in the comparison of very different groups
of countries. If the effect of income on institutions is larger for poor countries than for rich countries,
the local approximation is no longer tenable and the linear estimates might be biased. In view
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Our first strategy is to partial out unobserved fixed heterogeneity in a within-group regression. By
doing this we find a significant non-linear relationship between income and democracy. This evidence
is equivalent to the one showed in Figure 1, but also controlling for cross-sectional correlations
(i.e. time dummies) and the lagged dependent variable to capture state dependence. Fixed effects
estimates in dynamic panels are biased when the number of time-series observations is small (e.g.
Nickell, 1981). Moreover, in this context it is controversial to give a causal interpretation to the
within-group estimates. Feedback effects from democracy to income are also present in these within-
group correlations. As in Acemoglu et al. (2008), in order to further investigate causality issues we
consider first-differenced GMM (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991), finding again evidence in favor of a
non-linear effect of income on democracy.
On the other hand, it is well-known that first-differenced GMM estimators are poorly behaved
with persistent series such as GDP. This is so because lagged levels of the variables are only weakly
correlated with subsequent first-differences (e.g. Blundell and Bond, 1998). We repeat the GMM
estimation exercises using randomly generated instruments and find that the GMM estimates remain
virtually the same; this result confirms that a problem of weak instruments is present in this particular
application. In order to alleviate this problem, we also consider the likelihood-based counterpart
of first-differenced GMM and confirm that our result is robust to finite sample biases due to weak
instruments. Using the LIML counterpart of the GMMArellano-Bond estimator we find no significant
linear effect of income on democracy.4 On the other hand, we do find significant evidence in favour
of a non-linear effect, suggesting that income causes democracy only in low-income countries.
To understand if income has an effect on democracy is important for public policy decisions. If
democracy is a consequence of economic development, international policies toward countries with
authoritarian regimes should aim to foster the process of economic development, thereby hastening
the eventual replacement of authoritarian regimes with more democratic successors. By contrast, if
democracy is not caused by economic development, this may not be the route to free elections.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the data. Section
3 presents the empirical strategy and discusses the main results in the paper. Section 4 analyzes the
potential problem of finite sample biases due to weak instruments and presents estimates of “causal
effects” robust to this problem. Some concluding remarks are presented in the final Section.
2 Data
Many different indicators of democracy have been produced and employed in studies of comparative
politics and international economics.5 Our empirical analysis is based on the extensively used mea-
sures from the Polity Project.6 Polity IV covers the period 1800-2000 for 184 countries. Its main
4Using the Arellano-Bond estimator, Acemoglu et al. (2008) find a significantly negative linear effect of income
on democracy. We argue that this result is mainly due to the small sample bias of GMM estimators.
5See Munck and Verkuilen (2002) for a survey.
6See Marshall and Jaggers (2002) for a detailed description of the main characteristics of the democracy indicators
produced by the Polity Project.
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original index is normalized to lie between 0 and 1.
In order to keep comparability of our results with Acemoglu et al. (2008), data on GDP per
capita come from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (see Heston et al., 2002). In particular, GDP per capita
is measured in constant 1996 USD at PPP. The resulting dataset represents an unbalanced panel
of 137 countries over the post-war period 1960-2000. Following the recommendation in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2003) we take as baseline the specification in which we split the sample in ten-year
periods in order to avoid business cycle effects. In any case, we also present results considering data
at five-year intervals.
Although measurement error is an important issue in our measures of democracy and income,7
we are more aware of the consequences of the latter on the main results of the paper. This is so
because whenever the within country variation of measurement error in the dependent variable is iid
over time, it does not affect results. As the PPP adjustment of income in Penn World Tables 6.1
and 6.2 has been criticized (see Johnson et al., 2009), most of the results of the paper are replicated
using the more stable harmonization of prices presented in later version of the Penn World Tables.8
3 Non-linearities in Income and Democracy
3.1 Econometric Model
Acemoglu et al. (2008) propose to estimate the effect of income on democracy considering the
following model:
dit = γdit−1 + βyit−1 + δt + ηi + vit (1)
where dit is the democracy score of country i (i = 1, ..., N) in period t (t = 1, ..., T ), and yit−1 is
our variable of interest, the lagged value of log income per capita. Moreover, persistence and mean-
reverting dynamics of democracy are captured by the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable on
the right-hand side. ηi captures country-specific fixed heterogeneity potentially correlated with the
rest of variables on the right-hand side, and δt represents a set of time-specific shocks to democracy
common to all countries in our sample. Finally, transitory shocks to democracy and other omitted
factors in the model are represented in the term vit.
( ∂ /∂ )
7See Treier and Jackman (2008) for evidence of measurement error in the Polity IV indicator, and Johnson et al.
(2009) for inconsistencies in the PPP-adjusted measure of income presented in Penn World Table 6.1
8Results are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix.
advantage is that all of the indicators used in the construction of the aggregate measure are acces-
sible and well documented. According to this index, democracy reflects three essential elements:
the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express preferences about
alternative policies and leaders; the existence of institutionalized constraints on the power of the
executive; and, the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens. The original index ranges between −10
(pure autocracy) and 10 (full democracy). Following earlier literature considering this variable, the
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In this linear specification, the effect of income on democracy (i.e. ∂dit/∂yit−1 = β) is assumed to
be the same for all countries regardless of their level of income. Given the tentative evidence discussed
in the introduction, we expect an heterogeneous effect of income on democracy depending on the
income level. While democracy in rich countries might not react to changes in income, improving
income per capita in poor countries is expected to have a positive effect on their democracy standards.
The simplest specification that would capture this non-linearity is based on the inclusion of a square
term of income in equation (1):
dit = γdit−1 + β1yit−1 + β2y2it−1 + δt + ηi + vit (2)
where now the marginal effect of income on democracy is given by ∂dit
∂yit−1
= β1 + 2β2yit−1 which
linearly depends on the level of income, and β2 describes this dependence.
9 Provided β2 < 0, the
model in (2) represents a quadratic function with a maximum at y∗ = − β1
2β2
. Therefore, democracy
in countries with GDP per capita levels below y∗ positively reacts to changes in income. However,
once the income threshold y∗ is passed, this positive effect disappears.
Equations (1) and (2) might be estimated under different correlation structures between the the
error term δt + ηi + vit and the regressors dit−1, yit−1, y2it−1. In particular, we always allow for
correlation between the country-specific effects (ηi) and the time effects (δt) with the variables on
the right hand-side (dit−1, yit−1, y2it−1). Fixed effects estimates accommodate this correlation and are
consistent as N → ∞ and T → ∞. Pooled OLS is inconsistent in this framework which, as stated
by Acemoglu et al. (2008), ”...is particularly relevant in the context of the relationship between
income and democracy because of the possibility of underlying political and social forces shaping both
equilibrium political institutions and the potential for economic growth”.
With respect to the correlation between the transitory shock vit and the regressors, we consider
two different working hypothesis in this paper. We first estimate the model under the strict exogeneity
assumption presented in equation (3) which implies that both lagged democracy (dit−1) and lagged
income (yit−1) are uncorrelated with the full path of shocks vi = (vi1, ..., vit, ..., viT )′:
E(vit | di, yi, δt, ηi) = 0 (3)
where di and yi are the T × 1 vectors (di1, ..., diT )′ and (yi1, ..., yiT )′. Fixed effects estimator is based
on this assumption, which given the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable does not hold by
definition because dit−1 is correlated with vis for s < t, when T is small (Nickell 1981). Moreover,
under this strict exogeneity assumption, there is no feedback from democracy to income (i.e. income
is not affected by changes in democracy).
In order to alleviate these two drawbacks of the strict exogeneity assumption in (3), we also
consider the following working hypothesis:
E(vit | dt−1i , yt−1i , δt, ηi) = 0 (4)
9Assuming that the heterogeneity of the effect is fully described by a linear function of income might seem
restrictive a priori. Table A1 in the Appendix presents results considering a more flexible polynomial specification
providing evidence that the specification in (2) is flexible enough to capture the non-linearity in the income-democracy
relationship.
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democracy (dit) but also income (yit). However, future shocks (vit+1, ..., viT ) are not correlated
with neither current democracy nor current income. Therefore, we allow for a feedback effect from
changes in democracy to changes in income which seems to us a desirable property in the income
and democracy relationship.10 In order to accommodate the partial endogeneity assumption (4)
and given the dimensions of our panel dataset11 we resort to panel GMM estimators advanced by
Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991).
The most important reason, but also the most controversial one, that justifies our preference for
the Arellano-Bond estimator over withing-group, is the aim to give a causal interpretation to our
estimates, that is robust to feedback from democracy to income. However, this kind of estimators
is also interesting in this context because, as pointed out in Section 2, the measure of income used
in this study is likely to have measurement error. The within-group transformation may exacerbate
the attenuation bias due to measurement error while, under some conditions, panel GMM estimators
are robust to measurement error in regressors.12
3.2 Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the results when estimating equations (1) and (2) under strict exogeneity (i.e. Fixed
effects OLS) and partial endogeneity (i.e. Arellano-Bond GMM) using the panel of five-year data.
First of all, in column (1) we report the estimates if fixed effects (ηi) are not included in the model
so that the estimation technique is pooled OLS. In this case we observe a strong positive association
between income and democracy in levels as Lipset (1959) hypothesized. In contrast, column (2)
illustrates that once we control for country-specific effects and we only use within-country variation
this positive correlation clearly disappears (these two columns replicates columns 1 and 2 of Table
3 in Acemoglu et al. (2008)). This result would imply that during the post-war period, increases
in the income level were not associated with improvements in the democracy score across countries.
However, in column (3) we can appreciate evidence of a significant non-linear association between
10In addition to strict exogeneity and partial endogeneity, there is also a third possible configuration labeled as
strict endogeneity in which democracy and income are correlated with the full path of shocks from t = 1 to T .
Estimating the model under this assumption would require the availability of additional country-specific time-varying
variables uncorrelated with past, present and future values of democracy but correlated with the income level. Given
the difficulty and controversy of this task we prefer to work with the somehow less ambitious partial endogeneity
assumption.
11The panel dataset we consider for ten-year data has T = 4 and N = 107, so small T oriented estimators seem
to be more appropriate than other time-series oriented estimators such as Anderson and Hsiao (1982). Nevertheless
in the appendix we show that the non-linear effect of income on democracy is also found to be significant using the
estimator proposed in Anderson and Hsiao (1982), see Table A1.
12Whenever measurement error is free of serial correlation, the panel dimension of the data is helpful for dealing
with attenuation bias because it provides internal instruments. The list of moments employed in the Arellano-Bond
estimator is only a subset of the list of moments available when there is measurement error in models with unobserved
fixed heterogeneity. GMM estimators based on this type of moments were proposed by Griliches and Hausman (1986).
where dt−1i and y
t−1
i are the t−1×1 vectors (di1, ..., dit−1)′ and (yi1, ..., yit−1)′. We label this assumption
as partial endogeneity because all past shocks up to the current period (t) (vi1, ..., vit) affect not only
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changes in income and democracy after the sixties that somehow confirms the intuition of a positive
correlation in poor countries that vanishes after the y∗ threshold.
Table 1: Linear vs. Quadratic Specification — Five-year data
Pooled Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond
OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is democracy
Democracy Index t−1 0.749 0.449 0.446 0.590 0.611
(0.034) (0.063) (0.059) (0.106) (0.094)
Log GDP per capita t−1 0.053 −0.006 0.388 −0.351 1.368
(0.010) (0.039) (0.210) (0.127) (0.401)
(Log GDP per capita t−1)2 −0.024 −0.082
(0.012) (0.022)
Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Income threshold (y∗) 8.08 8.34
Hansen J Test 0.03 0.02
AR(2) Test 0.39 0.33
Hausman Test 0.00 0.00
Observations 854 854 854 747 747
Countries 136 136 136 114 114
R-squared 0.77 0.82 0.82
Dependent variable is the Polity IV measure of democracy. Column (1) reports pooled cross-sectional
OLS without country-specific effects; columns (2) and (3) presents Fixed effects OLS regressions under
the strict exogeneity assumption of income and democracy; finally, in columns (4) and (5) we present
results when applying the panel GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) which ac-
commodates partial endogeneity of both democracy and income. The sample period is 1960-2000 at
five-year intervals. The income threshold (y∗) is the (log) level of income per capita (at 1996 USD
PPP) beyond which the positive effect of income on democracy disappears. In all cases, standard
errors clustered by country are in parentheses.
In columns (4) and (5) we aim to give a causal interpretation to our estimates and we allow
for partial endogeneity of the income per capita variable. In particular, column (4) replicates the
result in Acemoglu et al. (2008) (column 4 of Table 3), taking into account the possible feedback
from democracy to income there is no evidence of a positive causal effect from income to democracy.
Nevertheless, by including a square term of the income variable in the model (column 5) we obtain
a significant and non-linear effect of income on democracy. This is clear evidence in favor of our
hypothesis of heterogeneous effects across different levels of income. Below a certain level of wealth,
increases in income generate increases in democracy confirming the Lipset hypothesis, but only for
poor countries.
Table 2 show results where the relationship between income and democracy is analyzed at lower
frequency by estimating similar regressions using the data over ten-year intervals. The results are
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similar to those with five-year data in Table 1. There is no evidence of a positive linear association
between income and democracy once the fixed country heterogeneity is partialled out, but a positive
effect of income on democracy, exists only for low levels of income. Again, this pattern holds for
both fixed-effects and first differenced GMM, but results are more conclusive when using the latter.
Hansen tests do not reject joint consistency of moment restrictions in any specification presented
in Table 1 (column 4 and 5) and Table 2 (column 4 and 5). AR(2) tests on residuals in the Arellano-
Bond GMM estimations indicate that there is no further serial correlation in both samples —at five
or ten-year intervals— and for both specifications —with and without the squared log-GDP—. In
addition, Hausman tests reject the null of equality between the coefficients estimated by fixed effects
OLS (efficient under the null) and Arellano-Bond GMM (consistent under the null but robust to
partial endogeneity) in both samples and in both specifications. The null of equality of coefficients
would be true if the exogeneity of income holds.13 This result supports our preference for estimators
robust to partial endogeneity of income such as Arellano-Bond GMM.
We also show in the Appendix that our results are robust to alternative estimation methods
and specifications (Table A1), and to alternative sources of income data (see Table A2). In Table
A1 we consider the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator, a more flexible polynomial specification,
a specification without lagged dependent variable and, finally, a simple segmented regression that
instead of the square term includes an interaction term between log GDP and a dummy variable for
rich countries. In all cases we obtain the same heterogeneous effect from income to democracy: in
poor countries, higher income is associated with higher democracy standards; however, this result
does not hold in rich countries.
4 The Problem of Many Weak Instruments
The intuition behind the panel GMM estimates presented in Tables 1 and 2 is that lagged levels
of the regressors are used as instruments for the same variables in first differences. Since income
is a persistent variable, its first differences might be weakly correlated with its lagged levels, which
implies that the relevance condition for validity of these instruments may be violated.14 Moreover,
the number of observations in the cross-section dimension (N) is small in this cross-country setting
13Fixed effects OLS produces efficient estimates related to Arellano-Bond GMM estimates because it is equivalent
to use all the available lags and leads as instruments.
14As illustrative evidence of this weak correlation, Table A3 in the appendix shows results from the first stage
regressions of the first difference of income on some of the lags available in the data. The covariances of every lag of
income with the current first difference are not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, as indicated by
the R-squared, less than 1 percent of the variation of the first differences of income is explained by each lag of income.
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Table 2: Linear vs. Quadratic Specification — Ten-year data
Pooled Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond
OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is democracy
Democracy Index t−1 0.555 0.060 0.062 0.309 0.431
(0.052) (0.091) (0.079) (0.134) (0.127)
Log GDP per capita t−1 0.098 0.007 0.549 −0.368 1.545
(0.017) (0.070) (0.326) (0.190) (0.523)
(Log GDP per capita t−1)2 −0.033 −0.090
(0.019) (0.030)
Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Income threshold (y∗) 8.32 8.58
Hansen J Test 0.01 0.08
AR(2) Test 0.38 0.75
Hausman Test 0.00 0.00
Observations 419 419 419 302 302
Countries 114 114 114 107 107
R-squared 0.64 0.77 0.77
Dependent variable is the Polity IV measure of democracy. Column (1) reports pooled cross-sectional
OLS without country-specific effects; columns (2) and (3) presents Fixed effects OLS regressions under
the strict exogeneity assumption of income and democracy; finally, in columns (4) and (5) we present
results when applying the panel GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) which ac-
commodates partial endogeneity of both democracy and income. The sample period is 1960-2000 at
ten-year intervals. The income threshold (y∗) is the (log) level of income per capita (at 1996 USD
PPP) beyond which the positive effect of income on democracy disappears. In all cases, standard
errors clustered by country are in parentheses.
and the first stage coefficients in the GMM framework proliferate as T increases. Under these
conditions, the first-differenced GMM estimator (Arellano-Bond) is poorly behaved (see Blundell
and Bond (1998) amongst others) because we have a setting with many weak instruments and small
samples.15
In order to further investigate this weak instruments problem in our framework, we repeat the
panel GMM estimation exercises in columns (4) and (5) of Table 2 but substituting the real instru-
ments (i.e. lagged levels of the regressors) by a set of random instruments completely independent
of the regressors. This technique was previously applied to the Angrist and Krueger (1991) data by
15Note that consistency of this estimator is based on fixed-T and N →∞, so that finite sample biases emerge due
to small N configurations, and worsen as T increases.
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Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995). It is striking that the results reported in columns (2) and (6) of
Table 3 look reasonable even with no information about the regressors in the randomly generated
instruments. The coefficient estimates are similar to the estimates obtained with the real instruments
(lagged levels of the regressors) presented again in columns (1) and (5) of Table 3 for the sake of
comparison. In view of these results, it seems to be that the presence of (many) weak instruments
represents a problem in this particular application.
Table 3: The Problem of Many Weak Instruments
Estimation Method
Arellano-Bond sub-system Arellano-Bond sub-system
GMM LIML GMM LIML
Instrument for lagged random lagged random lagged random lagged random
diff income income number income number income number income number
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracy Index t−1 0.309 0.349 0.193 0.292 0.431 0.296 0.231 0.292
(0.134) (0.167) (0.085) (0.116) (0.127) (0.159) (0.086) (0.117)
Log GDP per capita t−1 −0.368 −0.311 −0.043 0.000 1.545 1.294 1.169 −0.000
(0.190) (0.232) (0.093) (0.101) (0.523) (0.844) (0.464) (0.012)
(Log GDP per capita t−1)2 −0.090 −0.088 −0.068 0.005
(0.03) (0.044) (0.028) (0.014)
Income threshold (y∗) 8.58 7.35 8.60 0.01
Hansen J Test 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02
AR(2) Test 0.38 0.41 0.75 0.33
Observations 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302
Countries 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
Dependent variable is the Polity IV measure of democracy. Columns (1) and (5) present the results when applying the panel
GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) using the real instrument for first differenced income, i.e. lagged level
of income (these are the same as columns (4) and (5) in Table 1. Columns (2) and (6) repeat the Arellano-Bond estimation
exercise but substituting lagged income by a random number as instrument for first differenced income. Columns (3), (4),
(7), and (8) present the results in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) respectively, but employing the sub-system LIML estimator
instead of first-differenced GMM. The sample period is 1960-2000 at ten-year intervals in all columns. The income threshold
(y∗) is the (log) level of income per capita (at 1996 USD PPP) beyond which the positive effect of income on democracy
disappears. In all cases, standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses.
In the single equation case, it is well documented in the literature that the effect of weak in-
struments on the distribution of two-stage least squares (2SLS) and limited information maximum
likelihood (LIML) differs substantially in finite samples despite the fact that both estimators have
the same asymptotic distribution. Although the distribution of LIML is centered at the parame-
ter value, 2SLS is biased toward ordinary least squares (OLS). Moreover, Anderson, Kunitomo and
Sawa (1982) concluded that LIML was to be strongly preferred to 2SLS, particularly if the number
of instruments is large. In the panel data setting considered in this paper, Monte Carlo evidence
provided in Moral-Benito (2011) illustrates that the recommendation in Anderson, Kunitomo and
Sawa (1982) for cross-sections is also true in our panel setting; despite both estimators are asymp-
totically equivalent, sub-system LIML (i.e. the LIML counterpart of panel GMM estimators) seems
to be strongly preferred to first-differenced GMM in terms of finite sample16 performance when weak
instruments are present (see the Appendix for more details).
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Results when employing the panel LIML estimator to estimate equations (1) and (2) are reas-
suring. In contrast to first differenced GMM, coefficient estimates in columns (4) and (8) of Table
3 indicate that sub-system LIML is robust to the weak instrument problem previously discussed.
If randomly generated instruments are considered instead of real instruments, point estimates com-
pletely change becoming zero and the confidence intervals are much wider, pointing to the lack of
information contained in the random instruments. Therefore, we consider the results in columns (3)
and (7) of Table 3 as our preferred estimates of the effect of income on democracy. This is so because
in addition to address partial endogeneity of the regressors, they alleviate the finite sample biases of
Arellano-Bond estimates due to weak instruments.
According to these results, there is no evidence of a linear (and homogeneous) effect of income on
democracy during the post-war period (Table 3, column 3). Note that the Arellano-Bond estimate of
the coefficient of lag income, when the effect is assumed to be linear, is significantly below zero. At a
different confidence levels, this is true in most of results presented in Acemoglu et al. (2008). These
counter-intuitive results are consequence of the bias due to small sample size of the Arellano-Bond
estimator.
Although there is no significant evidence of an homogeneous effect of income on democracy, in
column 7 of Table 3, we show evidence of a non-linear effect from income to democracy; income might
cause democracy at low levels of income per capita, but this effect vanishes at a certain threshold
level. In particular, if income per capita is higher than 5, 431 PPP USD (exp(8.60) = 5, 431) the
positive effect of income on democracy vanishes. Approximately 80 per cent of the country-year pairs
are below this threshold in our baseline sample.17 Countries such as Afghanistan, China or Libya
are always in the positive income-democracy effect region.
5 Concluding Remarks
It is well-known in the literature that income per capita is strongly correlated with the level of democ-
racy across countries. However, Acemoglu et al. (2008), controlling for factors that simultaneously
affect both income and democracy (i.e. country-specific fixed heterogeneity), find that there is not
evidence of a linear effect of income on democracy, supporting the idea that societies embarked on
divergent political-economic development paths at certain critical junctures in the distant past. In
this paper we revisit the evidence connecting both variables allowing for a more flexible specifica-
tion. We argue that the effect of income on democracy may be different for different levels of income.
16Note again that we are referring to fixed-T , N → ∞ asymptotics so that finite sample biases arise because of
small N .
17This result motivates our partition of rich and poor countries in Figure 1.
This might be because stability of institutions is highly correlated with economic performance (e.g.
North, 1990); therefore, democracy in poor countries with more fragile institutions will be affected
by changes in income. However, in rich countries institutions are more stable and thus changes in
income will not have any effect on the democracy level.
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Using the same dataset as Acemoglu et al. (2008), we find that income has a significant non-linear
effect on democracy even after controlling for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity simultane-
ously affecting both variables. This effect is positive for lower values of income, but it vanishes
when income reaches a certain level. This result is robust to different econometric specifications and
estimation techniques.
Our first strategy is to partial out unobserved fixed heterogeneity in a within-group regression.
Although fixed-effects estimates confirm our hypothesis, there are good reasons to go beyond these
results. Fixed effects regressions in dynamic panels are biased when the number of time-series
observations is small. In addition, the indicator of income used is likely to suffer from measurement
error and the attenuation bias is exacerbated when only within variation is exploited. Finally, there
might also be feedback effects from democracy to income, and hence income would be partially
endogenous to democracy. We also consider first-differenced GMM (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991)
and its likelihood-based counterpart. Both estimators are robust to the mentioned cases of partial
endogeneity but the latter one is expected to be preferred in terms of finite sample performance when
instruments are weak. Both sets of results give significant evidence of a non-linear (causal) effect
from income to democracy; income might cause democracy at low levels of income per capita, but
this effect vanishes at a certain threshold level.
This evidence is relevant in the sense that it legitimates international policies toward poor coun-
tries with authoritarian regimes to encourage economic development, thereby hastening the eventual
replacement of authoritarian regimes with more democratic successors.
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A Appendix
A.1 Likelihood-Based Estimation of Dynamic Panels
In the single equation, as stated in the main text, it is well-known that the effect of weak instruments
on the distribution of two-stage least squares (2SLS) and limited information maximum likelihood
(LIML) differs substantially in finite samples. One possible explanation for this result is that LIML
imposes a symmetric normalization of the coefficients while the normalization implied by 2SLS is
non-symmetric (see Hillier (1990)).
Intuitively, the LIML model in the single equation case consists of the gaussian likelihood function
derived from the assumption of joint normality of the error terms in the structural and the reduced-
form equations conforming the 2SLS model. In the panel data case considered in this paper we
would have a set of structural form equations (one for each time period) and a set of reduced-form
equations (thus we can label the approach as sub-system LIML instead of simply LIML or Full
Information Maximum Likelihood — FIML —). In a recent paper, Moral-Benito (2011) writes down
this likelihood function for dynamic panels with partially endogenous regressors.18 In particular, the
structural equation in (1) is completed with an unrestricted feedback process which is specified in
the form of period-specific linear projections of the partially endogenous variables (lagged democracy
and log GDP per capita) on all available lags. Once the full set of equations is specified the likelihood
function is derived under normality of the shocks. It is important to remark here that the resulting
(pseudo) maximum likelihood estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal regardless of non-
normality.
To be more precise, this (pseudo) maximum likelihood estimator is asymptotically equivalent
to the GMM estimator proposed in Arellano and Bond (1991) because the resultant first order
conditions correspond to a GMM problem with a convenient choice of weighting matrix. On the
other hand, simulation experiments serve to evaluate the finite-sample behavior of this likelihood-
based estimator. In particular, results in Moral-Benito (2011) show that the estimator has negligible
biases in contrast to the commonly-used Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimator, which might
have large biases in small samples, especially when the generated series are persistent over time. This
can be interpreted as a generalization of the result in Anderson et al. (1982) for the single equation
case.
18Likelihood-based approaches for dynamic panel models with unobservable individual effects and exogenous re-
gressors are well-known in the literature (e.g. Bhargava and Sargan (1983); Alvarez and Arellano (2003)). However,
these approaches do not consider settings with partially endogenous regressors.
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A.2 Additional Results
Table A1: Alternative Specifications and Estimation Methods
Anderson-Hsiao Quartic No lagged Interaction
Estimator Specification Democracy Dummy
Sample Five-year Ten-year Five-year Ten-year Five-year Ten-year Five-year Ten-year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable is democracy (dt)
dt−1 0.723 0.590 0.400 −0.031 0.125 0.155
(0.138) (0.205) (0.038) (0.066) (0.070) (0.084)
yt−1 2.273 4.028 65.10 64.25 0.547 0.944 0.127 0.126
(1.072) (1.830) (20.55) (36.60) (0.266) (0.441) (0.058) (0.062)
y2t−1 −0.101 −0.181 −12.80 −13.30 −0.034 −0.057







Income threshold (y∗) 11.2 11.1 8.04 8.28 8.60 8.60
F -test 0.17 0.24
Observations 832 335 744 330 764 341 744 330
Dependent variable (dt) is the Polity IV measure of democracy. yt−1 corresponds to log GDP per capita, and Rt−1 is a dummy
variable for rich country-year pairs. In particular, Rt−1 takes the value 1 if the GDP per capita associated to a particular country-
period pair is above the 80 percentile of the empirical cross-sectional density of GDP per capita in period t−1. Columns (1) and (2)
report the estimates using the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) approach. In columns (3) and (4) we report the results when considering
a more flexible polynomial specification which confirms the concave relationship between income and democracy obtained in the
main text with the quadratic specification. In columns (5) and (6) we drop the lagged dependent variable from the model in
equation (2) in the main text. Finally, columns (7) and (8) consider the interaction dummy specification in which we allow for a
different income-democracy effect for poor and rich countries by including a dummy for rich countries interacted with income. The
income threshold (y∗) is the (log) level of income per capita (at 1996 USD PPP) beyond which the positive effect of income on
democracy disappears. F -test reports the p-value of the null that sum of coefficients on yt−1 and yt−1Rt−1 is zero (i.e. the effect
of income on democracy for rich countries is zero). In all cases, standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses.
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Table A2: Results with Penn World Tables 6.3
Estimation Method
Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond sub-system
OLS GMM LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracy Index t−1 −0.01 −0.01 0.30 0.49 0.59 0.62
(0.074) (0.076) (0.148) (0.145) (0.084) (0.123)
Log-GDP per Capitat−1 −0.011 0.80 −0.21 2.45 −0.16 1.55
(0.072) (0.426) (0.172) (0.914) (0.073) (0.488)
(Log GDP per capita t−1)2 −0.05 −0.12 −0.06
(0.026) (0.047) (0.027)
Hansen J Test 0.004 0.13
AR(2) Test 0.45 0.84
Observations 332 332 332 332 332 332
Countries 125 125 125 125 125 125
Dependent variable is the Polity IV measure of democracy. In columns (1) and (2) you can find the fixed effects estimates.
Columns (3) and (4) present the results when applying the panel GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Columns (5) and (6) present the results employing the sub-system LIML estimator instead of first-differenced GMM. The
sample period is 1960-2000 at ten-year intervals in all columns. A newer estimation of PPP-adjusted income provided
in the new version of Penn World Tables (i.e. PWT 6.3) is used as opposed to the chain index PPP-adjusted income.
This income measure is based on a constant price extrapolation of Domestic Absorption from 2005 to earlier and later
years. It uses the national growth rate of Domestic Absorption as the basis for the extrapolation. In all cases, standard
errors clustered by country are in parentheses.
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Log GDP per capita at t
Log GDP per capita t−2 −0.021
(0.020)
Log GDP per capita t−3 0.027
(0.025)
Log GDP per capita t−4 0.016
(0.063)
Constant 0.326 −0.086 0.134
(0.165) (0.197) (0.487)
P-value of F-test 0.30 0.27 0.97
R-squared 0.004 0.006 0.001
Observations 493 332 166
Each column represents an univariate regression of first-differenced log-
income per capita on different lags of log-income per capita in levels. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the country level.
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